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Abstract
Several theories propose that the cortex implements an internal model to explain, predict, and learn about sensory data, but
the nature of this model is unclear. One condition that could be highly informative here is Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS),
where loss of vision leads to complex, vivid visual hallucinations of objects, people, and whole scenes. CBS could be taken as
indication that there is a generative model in the brain, specifically one that can synthesise rich, consistent visual
representations even in the absence of actual visual input. The processes that lead to CBS are poorly understood. Here, we
argue that a model recently introduced in machine learning, the deep Boltzmann machine (DBM), could capture the
relevant aspects of (hypothetical) generative processing in the cortex. The DBM carries both the semantics of a probabilistic
generative model and of a neural network. The latter allows us to model a concrete neural mechanism that could underlie
CBS, namely, homeostatic regulation of neuronal activity. We show that homeostatic plasticity could serve to make the
learnt internal model robust against e.g. degradation of sensory input, but overcompensate in the case of CBS, leading to
hallucinations. We demonstrate how a wide range of features of CBS can be explained in the model and suggest a potential
role for the neuromodulator acetylcholine. This work constitutes the first concrete computational model of CBS and the first
application of the DBM as a model in computational neuroscience. Our results lend further credence to the hypothesis of a
generative model in the brain.
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Introduction
Visual hallucinations can offer fascinating insights into the
mechanisms underlying perceptual processing and the generation
of visual experience in the brain. A pathology known as Charles
Bonnet syndrome (CBS) [1–4] is of particular interest, for two
reasons. First, hallucinations in CBS can be very complex in the
sense that they entail vivid, life-like, and elaborate imagery of
objects, people, animals, or whole visual scenes. Second, the
primary cause of CBS is loss of vision due to eye diseases, with no
clear pathology in the brain itself and no necessary impairment to
mental health other than the hallucinations. De-afferentation of
the visual system and sensory deprivation thus seem to be the
important factors in the development of CBS, and comparisons
have been made to phantom limb phenomena. Unlike for example
in the case of schizophrenia, most often accompanied by auditory
hallucinations [5], in CBS there thus does not seem to be a more
pervasive malfunction of the cognitive system, but rather some
form of over-compensation or maladaptation of the relatively
healthy brain to the lack of sensory stimulation.
From a theoretical perspective, there has been an attempt to
unify complex visual hallucinations in various pathologies in a
single qualitative model [6], but many argue that the underlying
causal mechanisms are too varied to do so [7–9]. That
hallucinations occur in many different circumstances however
speaks to them relating to essential aspects of perceptual
processing. Thus, theoretical explanations that pose that percep-
tion inherently involves some form of active synthesis of internal
representations might be well positioned to shed light on the
generation of spontaneous imagery in hallucinations, which occur
even in CBS where there seems to be little defect in the visual
system other than at the input stage. Therefore, two key questions
arise here: what do complex hallucinations tell us about perceptual
processing in general, and what are the mechanisms triggering
CBS in particular?
The purpose of this computational study is hence threefold.
First, to gain theoretical insights into important principles of
cortical inference by employing the deep Boltzmann machine
(DBM) as a model system which is based on such (hypothetical)
principles. Second, to examine concrete causal mechanisms for
CBS, we model homeostatic regulation of neuronal firing activity,
elucidating on various aspects of CBS. Moreover, to examine a
potential role of the neuromodulator acetylcholine, we introduce a
novel model of its action as mediating the balance of feedforward
and feedback processing in the cortical hierarchy. And third, with
our results we aim to demonstrate the relevance of Deep Learning
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approaches such as the DBM as models of cortical processing. A
preliminary version of the presented work has been published [10].
Charles Bonnet syndrome
CBS is characterised by complex recurring visual hallucinations
in people who suffer from visual impairment but no other
psychological condition or hallucinations in other modalities [1–
4]. In particular, patients generally gain insight into the unreality
of their experiences. The phenomenology of CBS is multifarious,
with the nature and content of hallucinatory episodes as well as the
conditions favouring their occurrence varying from patient to
patient or episode to episode. Common themes are the vividness
and richness of detail of the hallucinations, the elaborate content
often entailing images of people or animals (though often of a
bizarre nature–figures in elaborate costumes, fantastic creatures,
extreme colours, etc.), as well as possibly common triggers, such as
being in a state of drowsiness and low arousal. Episodes can last
from seconds to hours, and hallucinations can reoccur over
periods lasting from days to years.
The eponym CBS itself is somewhat ambiguous or even
controversial [4,11–13]. Some authors put the emphasis on
complex hallucinations in visually impaired but psychologically
normal people, where the visual pathology can be anywhere in the
visual system from the retina to cortex; others define CBS to be
necessarily related to eye diseases only. Similarly, the delineation
of the term ‘complex’, and whether CBS should include complex
hallucinations only, appears to be not fully clear. On one end are
simple or elementary hallucinations consisting of flashes, dots,
amorphous shapes, etc., while on the other are fully formed objects
or object parts like animals, people, and faces [4,6]. Somewhere in
between are geometric patterns (‘roadmaps’, brickwork, grids, and
so forth). Some authors include the latter in CBS [13,14]. It should
be noted that simple hallucinations are actually more common in
visually impaired patients than complex ones, with a prevalence of
about 50% vs. about 15%, respectively [4]. Both types can occur
in individual subjects, possibly with a tendency to progress from
simple to complex over time.
For this modelling study, we identify the following key aspects of
CBS we aim to capture and elucidate on. First, we take the
common definition of hallucinations as compelling perceptual
experiences in the absence of external stimuli. They are to be
contrasted [4,6] to illusions as misperceptions concerning an actual
external stimulus, as well as to mental imagery. Unlike hallucina-
tions, the latter is under complete volitional control, lacks
perceptual vividness (it appears to be ‘in the mind’s eye’ rather
than in the world), and might also have a different neurobiological
substrate [13].
Second, in the context of CBS we are interested in hallucina-
tions that are perceptually rich in the sense that the experience is
similar to that of actual seeing. Presumably, this implies that the
representations instantiated in the neuronal activity patterns share
significant commonalities in both seeing and hallucinating, though
this requires further elaboration.
Third, we consider hallucinations on the complex end of the
spectrum, i.e. objects, people, and so forth. As we currently lack
good generative models of realistic images (biological or otherwise,
not counting here of course purely generative algorithms from
computer graphics that cannot be inverted for inference) the
model we employ still relies on relatively simple binary images.
However, it attempts to capture at least some aspects of how
complex, object-based hallucinations might be created in the
brain. For example, the content of complex hallucinations
presumably cannot be accounted for by appealing to anatomical
organisational properties of lower visual areas, which [14]
suggested for simpler hallucinations of geometric patterns in
CBS (referring to anatomical ‘‘stripes’’ in V2 etc.). Our model
relies on distributed, high-dimensional, hierarchical representa-
tions that go beyond local low-level visual features (e.g. V1-like
edge detectors). The representations are learnt and reflect
structure in sensory data beyond local correlations.
Fourth, with regards to the issue of whether CBS should refer to
hallucinations in the context of eye diseases only, our model is
meant as a model of processing in the cortical hierarchy, and due
to the level of abstraction we only require that visual input is lost
somewhere at a preceding stage and do not differentiate further.
We do however address the distinct roles of cortical areas within
the hierarchy.
CBS is a complex phenomenon with manifold symptoms and
little data beyond clinical case reports and case series. The aim of
our computational model is thus to qualitatively elucidate on
possible underlying mechanisms, to demonstrate how several
common aspects of CBS could be explained, and to gain some
potential insights into the nature of cortical inference.
Hallucinations and generative models in the brain
The occurrence of complex visual hallucinations in various
pathologies [6,15] as well as the imagery we all experience in
dreams show that the brain is capable of synthesising rich,
consistent internal perceptual states even in the absence of, or in
contradiction to, external stimuli. It seems natural to consider
hallucinations in the context of theoretical accounts of perception
that attribute an important functional role to the synthesis of
internal representations in normal perception, not just in
pathological conditions. In particular, one relevant notion is that
of perception entailing an ‘analysis by synthesis’, which is an aspect
of approaches such as predictive coding or Adaptive Resonance
Theory [16–23]. The idea is that ambiguous sensory signals
inform initial hypotheses about what is in an image in a bottom-up
fashion (from low-level image features to high-level concepts, like
objects and faces). These hypotheses are then made concrete in a
synthesis stage that tests a hypothesis against the image (or low-
Author Summary
The cerebral cortex is central to many aspects of cognition
and intelligence in humans and other mammals, but our
scientific understanding of the computational principles
underlying cortical processing is still limited. We might
gain insights by considering visual hallucinations, specif-
ically in a pathology known as Charles Bonnet syndrome,
where patients suffering from visual impairment experi-
ence hallucinatory images that rival the vividness and
complexity of normal seeing. Such generation of rich
internal imagery could naturally be accounted for by
theories that posit that the cortex implements an internal
generative model of sensory input. Perception then could
entail the synthesis of internal explanations that are
evaluated by testing whether what they predict is
consistent with actual sensory input. Here, we take an
approach from artificial intelligence that is based on similar
ideas, the deep Boltzmann machine, use it as a model of
generative processing in the cortex, and examine various
aspects of Charles Bonnet syndrome in computer simula-
tions. In particular, we explain why the synthesis of internal
explanations, which is so useful for perception, goes astray
in the syndrome as neurons overcompensate for the lack
of sensory input by increasing spontaneous activity.
Charles Bonnet Syndrome in a Generative Model
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level representation thereof) by making top-down predictions using
a generative process.
In computational neuroscience over the last two decades, this
notion of analysis by synthesis and related ones have often been
framed in probabilistic or ‘Bayesian’ terms. Generally speaking,
Bayesian approaches theoretically describe how inferences about
aspects of the environment are to be made from observations
under uncertainty (for reviews and introductions, see [24–26]). For
hallucinations, the relevant aspect of Bayesian models could be
that they offer a way of formalising notions of ‘bottom-up’
processing driven by sensory input, and internally generated, ‘top-
down’ processing conveying prior expectations and more high-
level learnt concepts. An imbalance of, or erroneous interaction
between, such ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ information could
underlie hallucinations [27–29]. More concretely, the mathemat-
ical entities in a Bayesian model or inference algorithm could map
to neural mechanisms and processing in the cortex. For example,
inference in a hierarchical model could describe hierarchical
processing [21]. Top-down processing then would correspond to
information flow from higher areas to lower areas, and inference
would be implemented via recurrent interactions between cortical
regions. Similarly, in the model of Yu and Dayan [27], a concrete
biological mechanism is hypothesised to represent the uncertainty
of the prior, namely the neuromodulator acetylcholine. The
authors thus refer the latter’s relevance in some hallucinatory
pathologies as evidence, where deficient acetylcholine, corre-
sponding to an over-emphasis of top-down information in Yu and
Dayan’s account, could lead to hallucinations [6,15,30].
As Yu and Dayan [27] state, a shortcoming of concrete
Bayesian models such as theirs is that they are often formulated
over very simple, low-dimensional, non-hierarchical variables. It is
not clear how their treatment of priors and uncertainty translates
to models that deal with high-dimensional problems like images in
a biologically plausible manner. This is what we need to address if
we hope to develop a computational model of CBS, and in this
context we will introduce a novel model of the action of
acetylcholine in similar spirit to Yu and Dayan’s framework.
Neuronal homeostasis as causal mechanism
While hallucinations in general might relate to an imbalance of
bottom-up and top-down in the cortex, the causes behind
specifically CBS and the involved mechanisms are poorly
understood (for discussion, see [1,4,12,15]). Evidence from CBS
and other pathologies suggests that an intact visual association
cortex is necessary as well as sufficient for complex visual
hallucinations to occur (e.g. [15]). For example, lesions to visual
cortex can cause hallucinations, but only if they are localised to
earlier areas and do not encompass the higher association cortex.
One of the insights emerging from the debate is that the pathology
in CBS appears to entail primarily a loss of input at stages prior to
association cortex. In contrast, hallucinations accompanying
epilepsy, for example, are thought to be caused by an irritative
process that directly stimulates association cortices.
How deficient input in CBS leads to the emergence of
hallucinations is unclear. Classic psychological theories suggest
that the lack of input somehow ‘releases’ or dis-inhibits perceptual
representations in visual association cortex. This somewhat vague
notion has been made more concrete by taking neuroscientific
evidence into account which shows that cortex deafferentiated
from input becomes hyper-excitable and generates increased
spontaneous activity. As [14] argues (also [12]), changes to
neuronal excitability as a consequence of decreased presynaptic
input, based on for example synaptic modifications, could thus
underlie the emergence of neuronal activity which establishes
hallucinatory perception in CBS.
Such adaptive changes of neuronal excitability have been
studied extensively over the last two decades in experimental and
theoretical work on homeostatic plasticity (see [31] for review; also
[32,33]). Rather than deeming them artifacts or epiphenomena,
such changes have been attributed important physiological
functions, allowing neurons to self-regulate their excitability to
keep their firing rate around a fixed set-point. Homeostatic
regulation is thought to stabilise activity in neuronal populations
and to keep firing within the neurons’ dynamic range, compen-
sating for ongoing changes to neuronal input either due to
Hebbian learning, or due to developmental alterations of the
number of synapses, connectivity patterns, etc.
A neuron might track its current activity level by measuring its
internal calcium levels, and several cellular mechanisms have been
identified that could then implement its homeostatic adaptation.
Among them is ‘synaptic scaling’, a change to synaptic efficacy
that is thought to affect all synapses in a neuron together, keeping
their relative strengths intact. Alternatively, the intrinsic excitabil-
ity of a neuron can be regulated by changing the distribution of ion
channels in the membrane. Both mechanisms have been observed
experimentally, dynamically regulating neuronal firing rate over a
time-span from hours to days [34] in compensation for external
manipulations to activity levels–in particular, in response to an
activity decrease caused by sensory deprivation.
Hence, with visual input degraded due to eye disease or other
defects in the visual pathways, homeostatic over compensation is a
strong contender to be the neuronal cause underlying the
emergence of hallucinations in CBS. This is the mechanism we
explore in our computational model.
Model
To address CBS, we need to work towards computational
models that can capture its key properties as identified earlier.
Such a model should be able to internally synthesise rich
representations of image content, such as objects, even in the
absence of (corresponding) sensory input. We now briefly describe
the deep Boltzmann machine (DBM). This being the first work
that applies DBMs as models of cortical processing, we discuss its
interpretation as a biological model. We also specify the
parameters used in the simulation experiments. For a more
extensive explanation and discussion of all aspects of the DBM
framework brought up in this section, see [35].
Deep Boltzmann machines
DBMs are probabilistic, generative neural networks that learn
to represent and generate data in an unsupervised fashion. They
consist of several layers of neuronal units arranged in a hierarchy.
The units fire stochastically, inducing a probability distribution
over the network state, parametrised by the weight (and bias)
parameters, i.e. the connection strengths between units. DBMs
were introduced recently in machine learning by Salakhutdinov
and Hinton [36]. While Deep Learning approaches such as the
DBM are often taken to be inspired by the brain [37], the
relevance of the DBM as a concrete model of processing in the
brain has not been explored so far. We argue that DBMs are
valuable as models of (hypothetical) aspects of cortical processing,
as the computational principles they are based on could play an
important role in cortical learning and processing as well.
A DBM is a special case of a general Boltzmann machine (BM)
by virtue of its specific architecture. BMs themselves were
developed in the nineteen eighties [38]. The reason that DBMs
Charles Bonnet Syndrome in a Generative Model
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have enjoyed recent interest in machine learning is not that the
basic underlying model formulation of a BM has changed; rather,
recent developments in learning algorithms have made it possible
to effectively train these models, taking advantage of their ‘deep’
structure to overcome earlier problems that made the application
of BMs difficult.
Concretely, a DBM consists of n layers of neurons (e.g. Figure 1).
Usually, the states of the neurons are taken to be binary, xi[f0,1g,
indicating whether a unit is ‘on’ or ‘off’, but other choices are
possible, such as continuous-valued, rectified linear units [39]. The
states of each layer are written as vectors, denoted by x(0), . . . ,x(n)
(together denoted by x). Units xi and xj in adjacent layers are
connected by symmetric connections with connection weight wij ,
the latter modelling synaptic strength. For each adjacent pair of
layers layers k and kz1, the weights can be combined into a
weight matrix W(k). Each unit also has a bias parameter bi that
determines its basic activation probability by functioning as a
baseline input. In a default DBM, there are no lateral connections
between units within a layer.
The first layer constitutes the visible units, i.e. they represent the
input data, such as the pixels of images. The higher layers contain
hidden units that are not given by the data. Rather, their states form
a distributed representation of the input data, the meaning of
which is assumed in learning. There, the parameters (weights and
biases) are adjusted to learn a good internal model of the sensory
input, in a sense to be described below.
Each unit i receives input zi from the other units it is connected
to via the weights (plus the bias),
zi~bizW
(k{1)x(k{1)zW(k)x(kz1): ð1Þ
This input determines the probability for the unit to switch on. For
binary units, it is computed using a sigmoid (logistic) activation
function:
P(xi Dx\i)~
1
1ze{zi
, ð2Þ
where x\i denotes all unit states other than xi. P(xi Dx\i) is also
called the activation (probability) of unit i.
If the DBM is run over a long enough time, by stochastically
activating its units, then the probability to find the network in any
state x asymptotically converges to an equilibrium distribution. In
analogy to a system described by (classical) statistical thermody-
namics (specifically, the Boltzmann machine corresponds to an
Ising model), this distribution is given by the system’s Boltzmann
distribution (assuming a temperature of T~1),
P(x)~
1
Z
e{E(x), ð3Þ
where E(x) is called the energy of the system and is defined as
E(x)~
Xn
0
x(k)TW(k)x(kz1)zb(k)Tx(k), ð4Þ
and Z is the normalisation constant.
DBMs as neural networks and probabilistic models
DBMs can be understood from two perspectives. The first is to
view DBMs as neural networks, simple models of neuronal
processing on a comparable level of abstraction and idealisation as
other connectionist-style networks used in machine learning and
computational cognitive models. In particular, BMs in general can
be seen as a generalisation of the Hopfield network [40,41], which
has been used as a basic model of memory storage and recall in
neuronal cell assemblies [42]. BMs differ from Hopfield networks
in two fundamental respects. First, in the latter, the activation rule
is deterministic. Initialised in some state, a Hopfield network will
converge to a state that forms a local minimum in the energy
‘landscape’. Learning aims to sets the weights such that this state
corresponds to one of the input patterns to be memorised. BMs on
the other hand explore the energy landscape stochastically,
potentially traversing several minima in the process. The second
difference is that Hopfield networks do not have hidden units.
Hidden units enable BMs to learn aspects of the data that are not
defined by pairwise correlations. Moreover, rather than just
capturing correlations between visible units (e.g. pixels in an
image) in the weights between them, hidden units can represent
specific patterns or features in the visible units, and explicitly signal
their presence or absence by virtue of their state. Thus, rather than
just memorising patterns, BMs can learn internal representations
of sensory data.
The fact that DBMs compute distributed hidden representations
in several non-linear processing stages also relates them to
feedforward neural networks. However, whereas the latter are
usually trained by providing desired output values (i.e., in a
supervised fashion), such as image labels, and tuning the weights
with the backpropagation algorithm [43], DBMs learn without
supervision, attempting to find an internal model from which the
input data can be generated.
The second perspective on BMs (and DBMs), perhaps more in
line with modern machine learning approaches, views them as
probabilistic graphical models of data. In this context, a BM is an
instance of a Markov random field, which is a probabilistic
graphical model whose independence relationships are captured
by an undirected graph (e.g. [44]). Rather than introducing BMs
Figure 1. Decoding the internal state. During perception, the
states of any hidden layer are decoded using a copy of the DBM as a
decoder. Starting from the hidden states of the layer in question, a
single deterministic top-down pass is performed to obtain a
reconstructed image.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g001
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on the basis of the stochastic activation rule, one can instead start
from the Boltzmann distribution, Eq. 3, as a definition of the
model via its joint distribution over the random variables x, and
then derive the activation probability (Eq. 2) for each unit simply
as conditional probability. ‘Running’ the BM stochastically then
produces samples from the joint distribution. In fact, iteratively
sampling each unit’s state according to its conditional probability
implements Gibbs sampling, a Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) method (see e.g. [45]). MCMC and similar sampling-
based methods have been suggested to relate to cortical
probabilistic inference [26,46–51], and it is focus of our work on
modelling bistable perception within the DBM framework [35,52].
DBMs as models of cortical inference
We argue that the DBM is promising as a model of
hallucinations, and other aspects of a hypothetical generative
model in the cortex, because it implements a generative model that
learns to synthesise representations of sensory data. A DBM can be
seen as an instance of a hierarchical probabilistic model, and thus
could capture the intuition of bottom-up and top-down processing
in the cortex reflecting the interaction between sensory informa-
tion and internal priors. An imbalance of such processing then can
be seen as a cause for hallucinations to emerge. At the same time,
the DBM is also a simple neural network, thus enabling us to
explore concrete neural mechanisms possibly underlying CBS.
Because the DBM does not just memorise given input patterns like
the related Hopfield network (which itself has been used to model
hallucinatory ‘memories’ in schizophrenia [53]), but rather learns
internal representations of input images, it is a more concrete model
of perception rather than just memory. The ‘deep’ organisation of
the DBM into hierarchical layers as well as the image based
representations will allow us to make concrete connections to the
visual cortex.
The DBM being a generative probabilistic model of sensory
data, the act of perception corresponds to inferring the hidden or
latent variables that are consistent with and could have generated
the observed input. We make a clarification here in light of a
current debate concerned with the merit and meaning of
approaches to cognition termed ‘Bayesian’ [54–58]. The ap-
proaches in focus there are characterised as rational, optimal, or
ideal observer models. They are meant to describe specific
perceptual inference problems, capturing what can in principle be
inferred about a specified property of the environment from
sensory data. In contrast, in case of the DBM model, the
probabilistic framework is used to develop a (component) solution
to perceptual tasks, perhaps capturing aspects of processing in the
brain, but this solution does not need to be ‘optimal’ in any sense.
In particular, the hidden variables in the DBM do not have by
design a priori meaning assigned to them in terms of the
environment, but rather attain any meaning due to whatever
useful representations are discovered in learning. Thus models like
the DBM differ conceptually from ideal observer models [35], but
these different approaches can still be related to each other as they
are based on the same theoretical language of probabilistic
inference.
Seen as a model of aspects of cortical processing, the DBM is a
rough idealisation, but comparable in that regard to other related
modelling approaches [35]. As we will show, the DBM does
capture several hypothetical aspects of cortical processing relevant
for explaining CBS.
Learning
Developing flexible models that can learn useful representations
of many kinds of sensory data is one of the key motivations behind
Deep Learning approaches such as the DBM. Such versatile
learning could also be what makes the cortex so flexible and
powerful across many sensory modalities. The learning algorithms
for BMs, and DBMs in particular, are themselves not focus of our
work on hallucinations here, but we summarise the key points
below (see Supplementary Text S1 and [35] for further comments
on the biological relevance and plausibility).
Taking the probabilistic model interpretation of a BM, learning
can be derived as likelihood optimisation of the model parameters
given some sensory training data. Notably, the resulting iterative
update rule for the weights of the model involves only local
Hebbian learning, and an alternation between two phases where
the BM either performs inference over some input or freely
generates from its internal model (this second phase could possibly
offer a normative explanations for dreams [59]).
There are three key aspects to why BM-based models have
found renewed interest in machine learning over the recent years.
First, the focus turned to BMs with simplified connectivity, in
particular the Restricted BM (RBM), where neither visible units
nor hidden units have connections amongst their own type (a
RBM is equivalent to a 2-layer DBM). Second, making use of the
simplified inference in such models, more effective approximate
learning algorithms were developed, such as the Contrastive
Divergence algorithm [60]. Third, RBMs were used as building
blocks to train deeper, multi-layer architectures such as the DBM.
Treating each pair of adjacent layers as its own RBM, the DBM is
initially trained one subsequent layer at a time, with each hidden
layer learning to generate the unit states in the respective layer
below. Once the whole DBM is composed, further training can
then be performed on the whole model.
The biological relevance of deep RBM-based models such as
the DBM has been examined by matching the learnt neuronal
receptive fields to those of neurons in the visual cortex [61,62].
Our study here is the first to explore the potential of the DBM as a
biological model beyond receptive field properties.
Decoding the internal state
To model perceptual phenomena with the DBM, we feed
sensory input to the model by clamping the visible layer to images,
sampling the hidden layers, and then analyse what is represented
in the states of the hidden layers during inference. In the case of
hallucinations we are in particular concerned with perceptual
content that is not matching the actual visual input. To decode the
hidden states in terms of the sensory data they represent, we can
make use of the generative nature of the DBM and ask what
images would be generated from the hidden states in question. We
thus take another DBM instance with the same parameters as the
DBM used to model perceptual inference to implement a decoder.
For any set of hidden states, the decoder is applied to obtain
reconstructed input images for each hidden layer independently
(Figure 1).
Specifically, given the states of any hidden layer x(k), kw0, at
any point during perceptual inference, we set the respective hidden
layer in the decoder DBM to the states to be decoded, and then
perform a single deterministic top-down pass starting from there:
the activations in each subsequent lower layer are computed using
only the layer above as input (propagating P(x(l{1)Dx(l))), until a
reconstructed image is obtained in the visible layer of the decoder
(taking probabilities as grey-scale values). The weights in the
decoder are doubled to compensate for the lack of bottom-up
input (analogously to the bottom-up initialisation used in [36]).
Possible alternatives to this decoding procedure are discussed in
[35].
Charles Bonnet Syndrome in a Generative Model
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Homeostasis in a DBM
We model CBS as resulting from homeostatic regulation of
neuronal excitability in response to degrading visual input. We use
DBMs that have learnt to represent images, having trained them
on either of two simple data sets. We then simulate the visual
impairment by using empty or corrupted input instead of the
original data, and have the model perform inference over them.
The change in sensory input could lead to changes in the
activation levels of the model’s neuronal units. To model
homeostatic mechanisms, we allow the neurons to adapt their
excitability in response.
As discussed earlier, homeostatic plasticity can be described as a
neuron adapting its excitability to match its current average firing
rate (as measured over hours or days) to a fixed set-point [33], and
there are several cellular and synaptic processes making this
possible. Here, for simplicity we model a single basic mechanism,
namely an iterative adaptation of each neuron’s intrinsic
excitability. With target activity pi and current average activity
ai, neuron i in the DBM should become either more or less
excitable according to the difference pi{ai. Its bias parameter bi is
thus iteratively incremented by
Dbi~g(pi{ai), ð5Þ
where g is a constant parametrising the rate of adaptation. Such an
adaptation of the bias has the effect of shifting the activation
function of the unit, i.e. the probability for it to switch on,
rendering it more or less excitable for a given amount of input
(Figure 2; cf. Figure 3a in [31] on homeostatic plasticity).
To define the target activity pi for each neuron, we simply take
the average activity of a unit during inference over the training
data (after training) as the normal, ‘healthy’ level of activity for the
representations learnt. An alternative would be to use the
homeostatic mechanism during training itself, specifying a target
activity level for the neurons. This corresponds to a regularisation
that has been used in machine learning e.g. to enforce sparsity in
the representations [61,63] (weight decay during training [64]
could be seen as another type of homeostatic mechanism akin to
synaptic scaling). We report here results without using this
mechanism in training itself, but we obtained similar results when
trying the latter. Thus, what mattered here is only that the activity
levels assumed during training were restored, regardless of whether
these levels were originally confined to a certain regime.
Simulation setup
We used two training data sets to explore different aspects of CBS
(Figure 3). The first is a custom set of binary images containing toy
shapes of various sizes at various positions. This shapes data set
allowed us to examine issues related to the localisation of visual
impairment, and due to its simplicity the perceptual content of the
corresponding hallucinations is straightforward to analyse by
directly comparing it to training images. The second data set is
MNIST, which contains images of handwritten digits and is a
standard benchmark used in machine learning. The advantage of
MNIST is that it contains objects that, if still simple, arguably have
some more interesting structure. With such kinds of data it has been
shown that DBMs can learn representations that generalise to
unseen instances of the data, not just in terms of classification
performance but also in terms of the data they generate themselves
[65]. This in particular demonstrates that learning does not simply
correspond to memorising training images.
For both data sets, the employed DBMs had three layers of
hidden units. The weights between layers were restricted to
implement localised receptive fields so that each unit was
connected only to a patch of adjacent units in the respective layer
below. Receptive fields in the highest hidden layer were global.
The biases of the units were initialised to negative values before
training to encourage sparse representations. In particular, this
lead to a breaking of symmetry between on and off states: by
encouraging units to be off most of the time, they learn
representations where they signal the presence of specific content
in an image by switching on [35,66]. Input degradation (which
models visual impairment) then generally had the effect of
decreasing neuronal activity, and in consequence homeostatic
regulation would have to recover firing rates by increasing the
excitability of the units. This matches the findings that cortical
neurons become ‘hyper-excitable’ under sensory deprivation (as
reviewed e.g. by [14]). Other than the sign of the activity changes,
overall results as reported in this study did not however depend on
representations being sparse.
For MNIST, the visible layer had 28|28 units corresponding
to the size of the images in pixels, and 28|28, 28|28, and
43|43 units in the three hidden layers, from lowest to highest,
respectively. Receptive field sizes were 7|7, 14|14, and 28|28.
The model was trained layer-wise for 30 epochs (i.e. iterations
through the training data) in each layer, using 5-step Persistent
Contrastive Divergence (Supplementary Text S1). The training set
contained 60,000 images, 6,000 per digit category (0 to 9). For the
shapes data set, the visible layer had 20|20 units and the hidden
layers 26|26 units each, with receptive field sizes 7|7, 13|13,
26|26. Here, layer-wise training consisted of 30 epochs of 1-step
Figure 2. Homeostatic excitability shift. The activation probability
(given by the logistic function) of a neuron shifts depending on the
value of the bias parameter b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g002
Figure 3. Examples from the training data sets. See main text for
details. (A) A custom data set of simple shapes at various positions. (B)
The MNIST data set of handwritten digits, a standard benchmark in
machine learning.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g003
Charles Bonnet Syndrome in a Generative Model
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 6 July 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 7 | e1003134
Contrastive Divergence (Supplementary Text S1). The training set
again had 60,000 images in total, from six categories (squares,
triangles in two orientations, all in two different sizes). It should be
noted that, due the limited variability in the shapes data set, all
possible image instances were covered by the training set. Hence,
only the MNIST data set is suitable to test the generalisation
performance of the model. Lastly, for neither MNIST nor the
shapes data set were the models trained further after the layer-wise
pre-training. See Supplementary Text S2 for further details on the
training parameters used.
To measure the preferred activity pi for each hidden neuron, we
averaged its activation over all training data (after learning), with
one trial per input image consisting of 50 sampling cycles. Here and
elsewhere, the hidden states were generally initialised to zero at the
start of a trial. Similarly, to measure the current average activation
ai during homeostatic adaptation, activities were measured over 50
cycles in 100 trials per iteration. Depending on the experiment in
question, the visible units were set to a different image for each trial
or remained blank (when modelling complete blindness). The
adaptation rate g was set to 0.1 and 0.04 for models trained on
shapes or MNIST, respectively, with a lower rate for MNIST as the
model was found to effectively adapt faster for this data set. For the
overall results, the precise value of the rate did not matter.
To analyse the perceptual state of the model, we decoded the
states of the hidden layers as described earlier, obtaining a
reconstructed image for each layer at each sampling step. To
evaluate the internal representations w.r.t. their possibly halluci-
natory content, we analysed whether the decoded images
corresponded to the kind of objects the models had learnt about
in training, using the topmost hidden layer’s states after 50
sampling cycles for quantitative analysis. For the shapes data set,
we employed a simple template matching procedure, matching the
image to the shape templates used in training by convolving the
former with the latter (each image had its mean subtracted and
was then l2 normalised). The maximum value of the resulting 2D
vector was taken as quantitative measure for the correspondence,
termed the ‘hallucination quality’, where a perfect match
corresponded to a hallucination quality of 1.
For the more varied MNIST data set, there are no fixed
templates, nor do generated images necessarily match instances
from the training set (which is the point of having a model that can
generalise, as mentioned above). To obtain a measure of
hallucination quality, we classified the decoded image as belonging
to any of the digit categories, using the confidence of the classifier
as a measure of the image’s quality. Specifically, we used an
instance of the DBM model itself (not affected by homeostasis)
with a classification unit attached (see e.g. [67]). Taking the
maximum of the posterior over the digit categories again yielded a
measure with maximum value 1. Inspecting the generated image
and resulting posterior values, we also confirmed that for images
that did not look like well-defined MNIST digits, classification
scores computed in this manner tended to be lower. It should be
noted that the aim of our work was not achieving high
classification performance, hence we did not train the full model,
fine-tune the hyper-parameters, nor necessarily implement classi-
fication in an ideal fashion. Classification is merely used to analyse
the quality of the internal representations. The reported error rate
for MNIST (7%) is hence higher than the state of the art, the latter
being around 1% for this type of model (e.g. [68]).
Results
The hypothesis we explored is that homeostatic regulation of
neuronal firing rate in response to sensory deprivation underlies
the emergence of hallucinations in CBS. The possibility for
synthesis of internal representations is explained by the cortex
implementing a generative model of sensory input. As a first step,
we aimed to demonstrate that the homeostasis mechanism as
implemented in the model can actually be beneficial in this
context.
Robust analysis by synthesis due to homeostasis
In the following, we show how homeostatic adaptation could be
helpful in particular for a model that implements perceptual
inference by synthesising internal representations, by making the
learnt representations robust against exactly the sort of visual
degradation that ultimately causes CBS. To this end, we had the
model (trained on either the shapes or MNIST data sets) perform
inference over heavily corrupted versions of the images (Figures 4A
and 4E). The latter were created by taking images from the data
sets (digit instances not seen in training in the case of MNIST) and
setting 65% of the pixels to black.
Degrading the input in this manner lead to profound activity
changes in the neurons, which the model was then allowed to
compensate for by employing homeostatic adaptation. Figure 4
shows how activity levels changed under input degradation and
subsequent adaptation, plotted either against the number of
preceding iterations or the total shift of the bias parameter so far
(averaged over all units). For all three hidden layers, initial
activities were lower when compared to normal levels. Homeo-
static adaptation then led to a gradual restoration to the original
values.
Importantly, this recuperation of activity levels corresponded to
a restored capability of the model’s internal representations to
capture the underlying objects in the images. We decoded the
hidden states of the top layer and classified the resulting
reconstructed images using a classifier trained on the original
data sets. Input degradation initially lead to a sharp drop in
performance in classifying the corrupted images (Figure 4D and
4H). However, homeostatic adaptation lead to a significant
improvement of classification, reaching a performance that was
close to the one achieved on the decoded representations inferred
from uncorrupted images.
Hence, the homeostatic mechanism as defined by Eq. 5 can be
sufficient to restore the representations inferred over sensory input
as to be suitable for classification. This is despite the fact that it
only attempts to match the average activations, i.e. first order
statistics of the inferred posteriors averaged over all input images,
rather than the full distribution learnt in training, and only does so
by adapting the bias parameters. Thus, homeostatic adaptation
could offer a simple local neuronal mechanism that serves to make
learnt representations robust for example against degradation of
sensory input. It does not rely on further learning (in the sense of
parameter changes that incorporate incoming sensory data),
intricate synaptic changes, or network wide measurements.
Rather, each neuron only needs to remember its average activity
level and regulate its intrinsic excitability accordingly. However, as
we will see in the following, this stabilisation of perceptual
representations can be detrimental, ultimately decoupling internal
representations from a further degraded sensory input, causing
hallucinations.
Emergence of hallucinations
To model more profound visual impairment or blindness, we
then repeated the above experiment but with the visible units
permanently clamped to completely empty input. As before, the
model had initially been trained on images from either of the two
data sets. With the model now performing inference over empty
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input, homeostatic adaptation was again allowed to take place.
Any emergence of meaningful internal representations in the
absence of input would correspond to hallucinations. See Figure 5
for an overview of the CBS experiment.
Before presenting the results, we should briefly comment on
how the binary input images are to be interpreted so that
presenting a blank image corresponds to ‘taking the input away’,
i.e. blindness. After all, seeing a black image is not the same as not
seeing altogether. Rather, the binary images are here to be
understood as proxies of images already encoded in neuronal
activity at an early stage of visual processing (e.g. primary visual
cortex). We here do not model this earlier encoding for simplicity,
but will consider equivalent cases later in experiments where we
model loss of vision in higher stages of the hierarchy.
Figures 6A–C show the activity changes resulting from visual
impairment and subsequent adaptation for a model trained on
MNIST (results for the shapes set were equivalent, Supplementary
Figure S1). Again we found an initial drop of activity that was
subsequently fully compensated for, at least on average over each
hidden layer, by the shift of the intrinsic excitability of the neurons.
What was the nature of the internal representations that allowed
for a restoration of activity levels? After all, the purely local
adaptation of each neuron might have recovered individual
preferred firing rates on the basis of noisy firing or other activation
patterns that bore no meaningful representations according to
what the model had learnt about initially. Instead, when we
decoded the hidden states of the model we found that the
represented content after adaptation corresponded to the kind of
images seen in training, whereas prior to adaptation, decoded
images matched the empty input.
To quantify this, we measured hallucination quality (as defined
in the Model section) over the course of homeostatic adaptation. In
Figures 6D–F, each dot represents the quality of the image
decoded from the topmost hidden states at the end of the 50
Figure 4. Homeostatic adaptation restores activity levels and internal representations when input is corrupted. (A) Examples of
corrupted images for the shapes data set. (B) Average activity levels in each of the three hidden layers over the course of homeostatic adaptation.
Activity levels are plotted against the number of iterations so far. Dashed lines correspond to normal activity levels for each layer with uncorrupted
input. Activities initially dropped profoundly as input was corrupted, but then recovered as the neurons adapted. (C) As in B, but plotted against the
total homeostatic adaptation in the neuronal bias parameters (absolute differences between current bias values and initial values, averaged over all
units). (D) Classification error using the internal representations to classify the corrupted input (see text for details). Top dashed line is chance, bottom
one is performance on uncorrupted input (here, for the simple shapes data set, the error is very close to zero, hence the corresponding line is drawn
on top of the x-axis). Over the course of adaptation, internal representations are restored as well, allowing for classification performance close to its
original level. (E–H) Analogous to A–D, but for a model doing inference over corrupted MNIST images.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g004
Figure 5. Overview of the basic CBS experiment. A model has
been trained on simple images (here, MNIST digits). Initially, decoded
internal representations correspond to what is given as input in the
visible layer. To model visual impairment or blindness, sensory input is
then removed, eliciting internal representations devoid of content.
Subsequent homeostatic adaptation of neuronal excitability leads to
spontaneous hallucinatory representations emerging (right-hand side
images are decoded from the hidden layers, receiving no sensory input,
3, 20, or 30 sampling cycles after initialisation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g005
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sampling cycles in a trial. It becomes apparent that hallucinations
started to emerge only after an initial period of silence, even as
excitability was already adapting. This is consistent with cases
reported in CBS where loss of vision was abrupt [4]. The reported
duration of this latent period, ranging from hours to days, in turn
matches well the time scale over which homeostatic adaptation
takes place [34].
In terms of quality, high-quality hallucinations were found soon
after the point when hallucinations emerged (see Figure 7 for
example decoded hallucinations). That point also marked a
profound increase in the rate of activity changes. This shows that
the emergence of stable internal representations is not just a
epiphenomenon of underlying activity changes, but rather itself
plays a key role in the system recovering normal activity levels.
Throughout the course of adaptation, we found there to be a
mix of hallucinations of various qualities. Lower quality images
could correspond to temporary states as the model transitioned
from one relatively stable state to another. Note that within any
one trial, the model never converges to a fixed internal state, as it
keeps stochastically sampling from the posterior. We did observe a
tendency to stay within one category of object (e.g. a specific class
of digit) towards the end of a trial, but this is simply a general
property of such models not specific to the hallucinations (we
address this issue in [35,52]). Similarly, hallucinations could come
from various object categories (among the digit or shape classes)
for an individual instance of the model. This matches reports from
CBS patients, which indicate there can be a variety of
hallucinatory content that varies from episode to episode for an
individual subject [2,4]. It is thus important that the model could
produce varied representations rather than just a few degenerate
states.
Sensory deprivation due to noise or impoverished input
The emergence of hallucinations in the model does not require
complete lack of input. We obtained similar results when
performing the homeostasis experiment with images containing,
for example, some noise (10% white pixels on black background
randomly sampled for each image). In that case, fewer iterations
and less homeostatic adaptation were needed to trigger halluci-
nations (Supplementary Figure S2). Hence, the nature of visual
impairment can have an impact on when or whether hallucina-
tions are occurring. This could also offer one possible explanation
for why there might be a tendency for hallucinations in CBS to
cease once vision is lost completely [4]. If one assumes that there
are limits to how much neurons can adapt their excitability, then
some remaining input, even if it is just essentially noise, might be
necessary to drive cortical neurons sufficiently. On the other hand,
an alternative explanation for a cessation of hallucinations might
be long-term cortical reorganisation or learning (see Discussion).
Figure 6. Emergence of hallucinations due to homeostatic adaptation. The model was trained on the MNIST data set (results for the shapes
data set were equivalent, Supplementary Figure S1). (A–C) With empty images as input, activity levels dropped in all three hidden layers and then
recovered over the course of homeostatic adaptation (original levels as dashed lines; see Figure 4 for explanation of x-axes). (D–F) Quality of
hallucinations (i.e. how well decoded internal representations matched the learnt images). Each dot represents the decoded internal state after the 50
sampling cycles constituting a trial (5 out of 100 trials per iteration are plotted). Blue curve denotes mean quality over 100 trials in that iteration. After
an initial period of silence, hallucinations emerged abruptly, quickly rising in quality. The emergence of hallucinatory representations coincided with a
more rapid recovery of activity levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g006
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Still, one potential problem with our implementation of sensory
degradation so far, be it with empty input or noise, could be that it
corresponds to a rather extensive damage to the visual system.
Perhaps one would be inclined to interpret such input degradation
as a model of complete blindness rather than a more graded visual
impairment (or one that is more spatially restricted, see the next
section), where in the latter case there might be some structure in
the sensory data left. Moreover, in all experiments simulated so
far, the emergence of hallucinations occurred due to homeostatic
adaptation that compensated for a rather massive drop in
activation levels caused by the lack of input. However, if the
introduced homeostatic mechanism is truly effective at stabilising
the distribution of learnt internal representations, one could expect
that the system could be prone to hallucinate under much more
general conditions than just lack of input: as long as the ongoing
input does not evoke a wide variety of learnt percepts, those groups
of neurons that participate in representing the lacking percepts
might compensate by increasing their excitability, possibly causing
corresponding hallucinations.
To address these issues, we aimed to test whether hallucinations
were exclusively a consequence of compensation for overall lack of
input and resulting activity decreases, or whether they could still
emerge with structured input that was however highly impover-
ished in its variety. To this end, we simulated the homeostatic
adaptation for the shapes and MNIST models, with the visible
layer clamped to only a single fixed image from the respective data
sets over the course of the whole experiment. To clarify, as before,
this models slow neuronal changes over the course of perhaps days
or longer, rather than fast neuronal adaptation during ongoing
perception, with neuronal parameters being fixed during trials and
only updated gradually between them.
Results are displayed in Figure 8, depicting activity changes
over the three hidden layers and examples of decoded internal
representations at various stages. We found that hallucinations
did indeed develop: initially, the decoded internal states faithfully
represented the image in the sensory input. However, as the
neurons adapted over time to compensate for the impoverished
Figure 7. Example decoded hallucinations. Examples (right-hand side) are shown with corresponding scatter plots for reference (left-hand side;
from Figures S1D and 6D). (A) for the model trained on shapes, displayed are examples from the six shape categories (columns, as categorised by
matching to the shape templates), for four different qualities (rows, with quality values listed on the right-hand side; images were of that quality or
within +0.05 thereof). For entries marked ‘n/a’ there was no hallucination of that type and quality (note that the categories are not really meaningful
for lowest quality images anyway). (B) Similar to A, but for the model trained on MNIST. Examples shown were classified as belonging to digit
categories 0, 1, 5, 7, and 9 (columns), for five different qualities (rows, annotation as in A). MNIST hallucinations of lower quality often looked like less
well-defined digits or mixtures of different digit classes, or they would deviate from the categories in the training set in more subtle ways. Human
judgement of quality and class could deviate from the classifier’s results in such cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g007
Figure 8. Modelling sensory deprivation due to impoverished input variety. (A) Model trained on shapes. (B) Model trained on MNIST. The
input layers of the models were clamped to a single image from the respective data sets throughout the course of homeostatic adaptation. Plotted
are resulting activity changes and example decoded internal states. Initially, decoded images (1) corresponded to the input. As neurons adapted and
the internal percepts deviated from the true input, global activities dropped (2), then recovered driven by hallucinatory percepts (3 and 4). For
particularly the MNIST model, we also observed a more gradual improvement in hallucination quality (compare B3 to B4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g008
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input, the internal representations entailed objects not actually in
the image, effectively decoupling perception from sensory input.
This result clarifies that the action of the homeostatic
mechanism can be much more specific than just recovering
overall activity levels. Indeed, for the fixed input images used,
initial global activity levels when doing inference were actually at
or above average, for the MNIST model and shapes model,
respectively (as is shown in the figures). The homeostatic
adaptation however acts locally for each neuron. With fixed
input, one sub-population of neurons, whose activation distribut-
edly codes for that input, will be highly active, while other groups
of neurons are less active than average. Adaptation of neuronal
excitability can then continuously shift the balance, even if activity
averages across a layer remain similar (we examined a related
functional role of neuronal adaptation on shorter time scales in
[35,52]).
As can be observed in the figures, there was an initial drop of
global activity levels, especially for the shapes model. Based on the
decoded representations at that point, we suggest that this results
primarily from the neuronal population that represents the initial,
veridical percept decreasing excitability. Then, as other neurons
increase their respective excitabilities, alternative, hallucinatory
internal representations take over, leading to a stabilisation of
global activity levels.
The degree of decoupling of the internal percepts from the
sensory input was striking. It appeared to be surprisingly robust,
overcoming not just a lack of input but even contradictory input. In
the case of the shapes in particular, the hallucinated objects do not
even necessarily share parts with the true input. It should be recalled
that the homeostatic mechanism merely adapts the local biases, and
thus does not at all change the connection strengths between units
or layers. Indeed, we could show that the flow of information from
sensory input to the higher layers was not completely prohibited in
the model after homeostatic adaptation. Running a model that
currently displayed hallucinatory representations as if decoupled
from input, we modestly increased the impact of feedforward
processing, using a mechanism meant to model the action of
acetylcholine (to be introduced below). The internal representation
then reliably realigned to the actual input image.
Localised and miniature hallucinations from localised
impairment
Visual impairment leading to CBS can also be constrained to
specific parts of the visual field. Although reports are conflicting
[4], for some patients at least hallucinations tend to be localised to
these regions. We tested whether we could reproduce this finding
using the model trained on the shapes data set, in which the
objects are distributed across various image positions. We
simulated a more localised impairment by repeating the homeo-
stasis experiment while blanking only half of the images (for
example the top half, Figure 9A). As before, the neurons’ activities
dropped initially and then recovered during adaptation as
hallucinations emerged (Figure 9B).
In the original homeostasis experiment, where visual impair-
ment involved the whole visible layer, hallucinated objects were
distributed across the whole visual field (Figure 9C). However,
when the model where only half of the images had been blanked
was tested (on blank images), hallucinated objects were restricted
to the image region that had been lesioned (Figure 9D).
Excitability changes due to homeostatic adaption are thus specific
enough in the network to have topographic properties.
Another occasional phenomenon in CBS is that hallucinated
objects appear to be ‘‘Lilliputian’’ or miniaturised. It has been
suggested that this can be explained as resulting from a mismatch
of hallucinated content and context, where hallucinations appear
against real visual background that happens to be too close in
relation to the size of the hallucinated objects [11]. On the basis of
our simulation results, we tentatively make another prediction: if
there is a propensity for hallucinatory content to consist of
meaningful wholes, such as full objects or faces, then in patients
where hallucinations are restricted to impaired regions of the
visual field there should be a correlation between object size and
the spatial extend of visual impairment. To see this in our model,
consider that in our shapes data set, objects could come either in
small or large versions. For models with full loss of vision,
hallucinations were biased towards the larger objects (Figure 9C).
Possibly, this is because larger shapes evoked higher overall activity
in the model and in turn were more suitable for activity restoration
(note for example in Figure 8A the transition from smaller to larger
Figure 9. Hallucinations with visual impairment restricted to the top half of the input. (A) Example images. (B) Hallucination qualities
during adaptation. Note that many of the corresponding decoded internal representations were not actually hallucinations, but rather matched
shapes that were in the unimpaired half of the visual input. In particular, in the early phase of adaptation there are two clusters at low and high
quality values. These correspond to void internal representations or veridical ones when shapes happened to lie completely in the impaired or
healthy halves, respectively. The former then were gradually replaced with emerging hallucinations. (C) Distribution of hallucinated small and large
shape categories across the image in the model with fully impaired input. Only hallucinations with quality greater than 0.85 were counted here. (D)
As C, but for the model that underwent adaptation with only the top half damaged (displayed data then taken with fully blank images as input as to
not be influenced by actual objects in the healthy region). Now, hallucinations were localised to the impaired region and favoured smaller shapes,
which would ‘fit’ within that region.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g009
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hallucinations as activity increases from point 3 to 4). On the
contrary, in models with lesions restricted to the top half of the
visual field, hallucinated objects were not only localised to the
impaired region as reported above, but the frequency ratio was
also reversed: smaller objects were much more common, and
larger objects were less frequent and narrowly centred relative to
the impaired region (Figure 9D). Moreover, we found that,
without a single exception, all hallucinations of larger shapes
happened to be of the ‘downwards-triangle’ category–the only
large category where most of the object could fit into the lesioned
region.
Thus, the process that generates hallucinations due to homeo-
static adaptation can specifically evoke only certain types of
content as determined by the nature of the visual impairment.
Here, it is those objects that happen to fit within the boundaries of
the lesion in the visual field.
The locus of hallucinations: cortical lesions vs.
suppression
We then turned our attention to the question of the roles of
different areas in the cortical hierarchy. As described in the
introduction, the complex content of hallucinations in CBS
suggests the involvement of visual association cortex and other
higher visual regions, and evidence implies that intact association
cortex is both necessary and sufficient to develop complex
hallucinations. For example, cortical lesions in early visual areas
can bring about the visual impairment that causes complex
hallucinations, but lesions that involve visual association cortex
appear to prohibit them.
Interestingly however, a study by [69] suggests that lower areas,
when at least partially intact, can still contribute to hallucinatory
activity in an essential fashion. The authors examined a patient
suffering from CBS due to visual impairment caused by lesions in
early visual areas. Maybe contrary to expectation, applying
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to early areas in a
way thought to cause cortical suppression lead to a temporary
cessation of the hallucinations. The authors argue that their
finding goes contrary to the ‘release’ theory of complex
hallucinations, according to which the lack of input to higher
areas from lower areas somehow disinhibits or releases perceptual
representations. Under this theory, the further suppression of the
already damaged early areas in the patient should only have
exaggerated the hallucinations.
Using the DBM model, we examined these issues relating to the
role of areas in the cortical hierarchy. The hierarchical compu-
tations in the DBM are simplistic compared to the cortical
equivalent; however, we show that a generative model consisting
of several subsequent processing stages differentiated at least by
increasing receptive field sizes is sufficient to explain the
phenomena at hand.
To begin with, we found that DBMs trained without the
topmost hidden layer failed to learn generative models of the data,
and thus were inevitably incapable of producing corresponding
hallucinations. This mirrors visual association cortex being
necessary for complex hallucinations, and can be explained in
the model with lower layers being incapable of learning the full
structure of objects in the images, due to their limited receptive
field sizes.
What about intact higher areas being sufficient for the
emergence of hallucinations, while lower ones are not necessary?
To model lesions to early visual areas, we repeated the homeostasis
experiment, only this time we did not blank the input but rather
‘lesioned’ the first hidden layer, i.e. we clamped units in the latter
rather than the units in the visible layer to zero (thus, with the first
processing stage blocked, the actual content in the visible units was
rendered irrelevant). As before, hallucinations did emerge over the
course of homeostatic adaptation (Supplementary Figure S3).
Hence, remaining layers in the model are sufficient in principle as
long as they form a network that can synthesise the relevant
information about visual objects.
Finally, we modelled the suppression of early visual areas with
TMS in a CBS patient as described by [69]. Unlike in the last
experiment, where early areas were permanently incapacitated
and higher areas adapted over time, the TMS experiment
corresponded to a temporary suppression in a system that had
already developed hallucinations, presumably due to prior
adaptation to visual impairment. Our setup thus used a model
that had undergone homeostatic adaptation in response to blank
visual input but with all hidden layers intact, as in the first
hallucination experiment, leading to hallucinatory activity. We
then temporarily clamped the first hidden layer to zeros, modelling
suppression with TMS (assuming that the cortical regions
suppressed by TMS in the patient can be modelled to be
downstream from the lesioned areas). This caused the hallucina-
tions to cease. Thus, even though this ‘early area’ represented by
the first hidden layer is neither sufficient nor necessary for the
model to develop hallucinations in the long run (as shown earlier
in this section), it can be essential for ongoing hallucinations if it was
in the first place part of the system when it underwent homeostatic
adaptation.
One possible interpretation of the relevance of lower areas could
be that they provide higher areas with unspecific input, in the
context of which the adaptation takes place. However, we suggest
that the role of lower areas could be more subtle thanks to
recurrent interactions with higher ones. As can be seen in the
example in Figure 5, the representations assumed in lower layers
during hallucinations are somewhat specific to the hallucinated
object, even though those layers by themselves are incapable of
synthesising it. Thus, this necessarily is a result of feedback from
higher areas. It seems plausible that the lower areas could also
contribute by stabilising the overall perceptual state assumed
across the hierarchy. Then, any significant interference with
representations in lower areas, not just suppression of activity,
might impede hallucinations. Indeed, in the study of [69], even a
TMS protocol used to cause not suppression but illusory flashes of
light (‘‘phosphenes’’), applied to primary visual cortex of the
patient, resulted in a disruption of hallucinatory content. In future
work, this could be tested by trying out different forms of
manipulations other than suppression in the hidden layers of the
model.
A novel model of acetylcholine and its role in CBS
Finally, one relatively common feature among CBS patients is
that hallucinatory episodes are more likely to occur in states of
drowsiness or low arousal. This suggests a role of cholinergic
systems, which in turn are implicated in complex hallucinations in
a variety of situations outside of CBS, whether drug induced or
disease related [15,30]. Indeed, in the (non-computational) model
of complex hallucinations of [6], acetylcholine (ACh) dysfunction
is attributed a major importance. At the same time, there is no
evidence that an actual ACh dysfunction exists in CBS. Rather, in
CBS the correlation with state of arousal might be effected by an
interplay of hallucinations with physiologically normal fluctuations
of ACh.
Making the connection between a lack of ACh and hallucina-
tions is natural as there is experimental evidence that ACh acts
specifically to emphasise sensory input over internally generated
information, mediating ‘‘the switching of the cortical processing
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mode from an intracortical to an input-processing mode’’ [70]. In
the computational model of [27], ACh is modelled in a Bayesian
framework to modulate the interaction between bottom-up
processing carrying sensory information and top-down processing
conveying prior expectations. The authors noted the relation to
hallucinations, but to our knowledge, there is no computational
model exploring it concretely.
Here, we explore an extended interpretation of the action of
ACh as mediating the balance between external and intracortical
input: in the hierarchy of cortical areas, ACh could affect the
balance in the integration of feedforward and feedback informa-
tion at each stage of the hierarchy. At an intermediate stage,
feedforward information from lower areas indirectly carries
sensory input, and feedback information is more internally
generated, keeping with the idea of a ACh mediated switch
between external and internal inputs. However, both feedforward
and feedback inputs would in this case be intracortical (perhaps
with additional effects on any direct thalamic inputs).
We thus model the effect of ACh in the following way. In the
DBM model, each (intermediate) hidden layer receives input from a
layer below, conveying directly or indirectly sensory information, and
from a layer above that has learnt to generate or predict the former
layer’s activity. ACh is to set the balance between feedforward and
feedback flow of information. We introduce a balance factor a[½0,1,
so that an intermediate layer x(k) is sampled as
P(x
(k)
i ~1jx(k{1), x(kz1))
~s(
X
j
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j z
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given states x(
:) and weightsW(
:) above and below (biases omitted for
brevity). Hence, aw0:5 corresponds to increased feedforward flow of
information, assumed to model increased ACh levels, and a~0:5
recovers the normal sampling mode for normal levels. We note that
this mechanism is a heuristic in that it treats the DBM as a neural
network more than a well-defined probabilistic model. In particular,
for a=0:5, the effective connections between layers are no longer
symmetrical and thus the model no longer constitutes a Boltzmann
machine (in a sense, the factor a interpolates between inference in a
DBM and approximate inference in a deep belief net [67], defined
with the same parameters).
ACh and contour completion. Before we turn to the role of
ACh in CBS, we first briefly demonstrate its effect on the balance
between feedforward and feedback under normal sensory input.
One example where it has been suggested that feedback could play
a role is contour completion (see e.g. the hierarchical Bayesian
inference account of [21]). Given an incomplete stimulus, higher
areas might fill in missing information and subsequently convey it
to lower areas, possibly leading to the perception of illusory
contours.
We explored this phenomenon and a possible interaction with
cortical ACh levels by testing the models on modified images
where parts of the objects had been blanked out (Figure 10).
Shown are examples of the decoded representations inferred by
the model, for all three hidden layers and three different levels of
ACh in both intermediate hidden layers, each for two different
input images. We found that completion did indeed take place,
especially in higher layers. Increased ACh levels, modelled with
a~0:7, resulted in an emphasis on bottom-up processing, leading
to less completion, in particular in lower layers that now received
less top-down feedback. Decreased ACh levels on the other hand
had the opposite effect. It should be noted that the generative
nature of the DBM allows for much more extensive completion of
image information if the visible units are sampled where filling-in
should take place (e.g. [65]). In our model however, the whole
visible layer always remains clamped, because this layer represents
an early stage of processing where input is still represented
faithfully in a bottom-up fashion. Filling in only happens in the
subsequent hidden layers. Contour completion thus occurs more
gradually in the hierarchy, rather than completely surmounting
the sensory input itself.
ACh and CBS. We modelled the effect of drowsiness or low
arousal on hallucinations in CBS as follows. We assumed that
drowsiness is accompanied by a decrease in ACh, modelled as
a~0:3. This value was chosen to obtain a clear effect while still
allowing for both feedforward and feedback processing to play a
role during inference. As states of drowsiness are intermittent with
periods of normal or increased vigilance, we assumed that on
average, ACh levels are still balanced. Hence, the homeostasis
experiment was conducted such that at each iteration, activity
levels were taken as average over 100 trials as before (see the
Model section), but half of the trials were performed with low a,
and the remainder with increased ACh levels at a~0:7, yielding a
normal value of 0:5 on average.
Figure 10. Contour completion and interaction with ACh levels a. Incomplete images (lower left) were given to either shapes or MNIST
models as input. Displayed are decoded hidden representations for the three hidden layers (rows), for three different levels of ACh (columns). Mean-
field inference (i.e. propagating activities instead of samples [68]) was used here to reduce sample variability/noise. Filling-in of missing contours
occurs more in higher than lower layers. ACh shifts the balance towards bottom-up processing, leading to less filling-in with increased levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g010
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For both shapes and MNIST models, results are displayed in
Figure 11, both for trials with a~0:3 and a~0:7 (dark and light
curves, respectively). We found that with decreased levels of ACh,
less homeostatic adaptation of excitability was necessary to elicit
hallucinations (adaptation values not shown for brevity). In
particular, for some intermediate level of adaptation, hallucina-
tions only occurred with decreased but not with increased levels of
ACh. This would thus correspond to a situation where hallucina-
tions would only be triggered during drowsiness.
Throughout later parts of the simulation, activity levels for each
hidden layer were generally twice as high during trials with a~0:3
compared to those with a~0:7, restoring original activity levels on
average. Thus, alternating hallucinatory episodes and relatively
silent periods, triggered by changing factors such as ACh levels,
could restore mean activity levels, as long as the timescales over
which neurons measure their average activity are long enough to
encompass both. A possible prediction from our findings is that
cortical activation during hallucinatory episodes should actually be
higher than what they had been during healthy perception.
Hallucination quality actually peaked early on for low ACh
trials, coinciding with the point in time when activity levels in
those trials crossed approximately the original levels (point 1 in the
figures). Because the neurons measured current activity over both
low and high ACh trials, activity increased further, leading to a
decreased quality of hallucinations. This was especially true for the
MNIST model, where unnaturally high activity resulted in over-
expressed imagery that showed little variety (point 2). However,
over the further course of adaptation, activity levels for low ACh
dropped again somewhat as the trials with higher ACh began to
contribute activity, resulting in more distinct if still somewhat over-
expressed hallucinatory images (point 4).
A related finding was a relationship between global activity
levels and hallucinatory content in the shapes model. Corrobo-
rating what we observed earlier (see the experiment on localised
hallucinations), internal representation of smaller shapes evoked
less activation (averaged over a hidden layer) than that of larger
shapes. Because alternating ACh levels led to hallucinations mostly
during episodes of heightened activity, well-formed hallucinations
developed to be mostly shapes of the larger categories. Increased
activity levels thus caused hallucinations of larger extent in the
shapes model and over-expressed digits in the MNIST model.
Possibly, such over-activation of cortical neurons might explain
why hallucinations in CBS can be so vivid, for example involving
‘‘hyperintense, vivid, brilliant colours’’ [71].
Figure 11. Hallucinations with fluctuating ACh levels. Over the course of homeostatic adaptation, each iteration consisted of both trials with
low and high values of the ACh parameter, a~0:3 (dark curves, black dots) and a~0:7 (light curves, light blue dots), respectively. (A–B) Average
activities and hallucination quality for the shapes model. (C) Example decoded hallucinations at time points indicated in A–B. (D–F) Analogously for
the MNIST model. For both models, lower ACh levels led to hallucinations earlier and with less homoestatic adaptation. In particular, there is an early
phase in which hallucinations occurred only with a~0:3. Hallucinations that do emerge later on for a~0:7 remain weaker and less formed for most of
the simulation. The difference in frequency of hallucinations also entails a corresponding difference in activity levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003134.g011
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Discussion
We modelled the emergence of complex hallucinations in CBS
as a result of homeostatic regulation of neuronal firing rate in
response to degradation of visual input. Our computational model
thus elucidates on similar suggestions in the literature [12,14]. The
homeostasis mechanism is meant to underlie specifically CBS.
Other pathologies involving complex hallucinations, such as
schizophrenia or Lewy body dementia [15], might have different
causes. In particular, it might not be feasible to unify complex
hallucinations in a single explanatory framework (as proposed in
[6]). What different conditions accompanied by complex halluci-
nations do have in common however is that they show that the
brain can spontaneously synthesise rich representations of visual
imagery, even in absence of or in contradiction to actual sensory
data. Following notions of the brain implementing perception as
analysis by synthesis, our study makes use of the DBM model that
can learn to synthesise internal representations of images, in an
unsupervised fashion, by virtue of being a generative model.
We reproduced a variety of qualitative aspects of CBS found in
some patients, such as an initial latent period, a possible
localisation of hallucinations to impaired parts of the visual field,
and the effect of suppression of cortical activity. We predict a
possible correlation between a tendency to experience miniature
versions of objects and the degree to which the spatial extent of
visual impairment is limited, as well as activity levels during
hallucinatory episodes possibly being higher than what they had
been during comparable, stimulus evoked normal perception. We
introduced a novel model of the action of acetylcholine (ACh),
suggesting that it could not only influence the balance between
thalamic and intracortical inputs [70], but also the balance
between feedforward and feedback at various stages of the cortical
hierarchy. In CBS in particular, a possible lack of ACh at cortical
sites, e.g. during normal fluctuations entailed in changes of state of
arousal, could be conducive to the emergence of hallucinations.
We suggest that interfering with cortical homeostatic mechanisms
might prevent the emergence of hallucinations in CBS. Whether
such an intervention would be feasible in practice is unclear, given
that the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie homeostatic
plasticity are much more complex [33,72] than our simple model of
homeostatic adaptation. Alternatively, perhaps counter to intuition,
it might be possible to suppress the formation of hallucinations in
CBS by up regulating cortical activity in deprived areas, through
pharmacological means or through methods such as TMS, as long
as the externally imposed activation is too unspecific to allow for
well-formed percepts to emerge.
In the model, internal representations of learnt objects were
robustly recovered by the homeostatic adaptation in a variety of
conditions, be it complete lack of input, noise input, or naturally
structured but highly impoverished input consisting of fixed
images. A key aspect of the model was that hallucinations did not
consist only of stereotyped images, but rather a variety of percepts
reflecting at least a part of the full distribution of objects learnt
initially. Such variety across episodes is also reported in many CBS
patients [2,4]. In the model, this variability was due to different
groups of neurons participating in coding for different percepts,
meaning that a local homeostatic restoration of activity levels for
the population required activation of a variety of percepts over
time. We would predict that less variety in hallucinatory content
should correlate with sensory deprivation being less extensive (e.g.
only affecting colour vision, see below).
That hallucinations emerged even when normal input images
were used but kept fixed over the course of homeostasis, shows that
it was not so much the total lack of sensory input or global drop in
evoked activity that mattered, but rather the failure of the given
input to evoke a wide range of learnt percepts. Whether
impoverished input can have such a powerful impact on
perception in reality should be explored further. There is indeed
evidence that sensory deprivation (in terms of general impover-
ishment, not just complete lack of sensory input) can cause
hallucinations in healthy individuals [4,29], but there seems to
have been little experimental work along that direction since the
nineteen sixties [73].
To our knowledge, our work constitutes the first computational
model that concretely explored aspects of CBS. Other neurological
pathologies have been studied before with neural network models
[74–77]. Probably most closely related to our work, Ruppin et al.
[53] modelled the emergence of hallucinatory memory patterns in
schizophrenia, using a Hopfield network (a line of work initiated
by [78]). The underlying mechanism, homeostatic plasticity in
response to input degradation, is quite similar, and some
analogous observations are made, including a beneficial role for
homeostatic regulation for stabilising neuronal representations.
However, in their model the hallucinatory ‘memories’, supposedly
residing in prefrontal cortex, are accounted for much more
abstractly, consisting of random patterns. Moreover, the retrieved
patterns in a Hopfield net correspond directly to the patterns
provided as input. It is thus not obvious how to relate their
network and the stored patterns to specifically visual processing,
which is essential for studying CBS. Our model can be seen as a
significant extension of their work in that direction. It involves
hierarchical, topographic representations of images, learnt in a
generative model framework. In particular, the synthesised
representations are interpreted to play an integral part in perception
itself, not just in unspecified memory-like pattern recall. A
generative model moreover relates to other approaches discussed
in the context of hallucinations (Bayesian inference, predictive
coding, adaptive resonance; [27–29,79]).
We emphasise the distinction between the roles that homeo-
static adaptation and learning play in our model and possibly the
cortex. Learning is to be seen as a lasting change of circuitry that
captures aspects of the sensory input in the neuronal representa-
tions, improving the network’s function according to some
criterion. In the generative model, that criterion would be the
ability to generate or predict the input itself, but it could also be
the utility of the representations towards some other goal, such as
discrimination of objects. Homeostatic adaptation on the other
hand could serve to stabilise neuronal representations. While such
stabilisation can in turn be important during learning itself [33],
we have shown in the model that it could offer a simple local
mechanism to make representations more robust once they have
been learnt, for instance to counteract degradation in input quality
[53] –thus effectively resisting changing aspects of the input, rather
than capturing them via learning.
At the point in time where we simulate homeostatic stabilisa-
tion, learning might have concluded, having taken place in earlier
stages of development, or it could still occur but over longer time
scales. A decoupling of the time scales of homeostatic adaptation
and learning could also explain why CBS can recede over time.
Hallucinations might initially be caused by the short-term
homeostatic regulation of neuronal activity, but long-term cortical
reorganisation could lead to their cessation [14]. In our
framework, such reorganisation would correspond to learning to
generate the impaired sensory input. Indeed, if we continue learning
in the model as the input layer is clamped to empty or noise
images, rather than just perform homeostatic adaptation, the
model learns to generate and thus represent the empty input,
losing the capability for hallucinations in the process.
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CBS in comparison to schizophrenia
In conditions such as schizophrenia, multiple sensory modalities
are affected and hallucinations are only one symptom among
many, including delusional beliefs. In contrast, hallucinations in
CBS are, by definition, restricted to the visual modality and
patients gain insight into the unreality of their percepts (at least
upon reflection or after being corrected by others [2,4]). These
features of CBS are explained by our account: in our model,
hallucinatory representations are restricted to neuronal popula-
tions most directly affected by lack of sensory drive (even
respecting retinotopy). Thus, there is no reason to expect that
non-visual areas should be impaired in any way, including
prefrontal areas. CBS patients should hence be able to reason
about their percepts being unreal.
As for the underlying mechanisms, we suggest that homeostatic
compensation triggered by degrading input is key to CBS but not
necessarily schizophrenia (though see [53]). Briefly, many neural
network models of schizophrenia [76,77] can be characterised as
proposing that internal disruptive neural changes (such as
increased noise or excessive synaptic pruning) destabilise internal
representations, primarily in non-sensory areas or across cortical
systems (thus affecting reasoning as well). In sensory areas deprived
of sensory input, it is not clear that unspecific maladaptive changes
such as increased noise alone could generate the lasting, complex,
coherent, and varying hallucinations of CBS. Instead our proposal
is that in CBS, it is in a sense a stabilisation of internal
representations, in response to external disruptions in the sensory
periphery, that causes hallucinations.
It should be noted that neurobiological changes such as
increased noise or synaptic pruning could also be explored in
the DBM. However, if non-sensory areas such as prefrontal cortex
are the subject of inquiry, then the DBM and the hierarchical
generative model it embodies might not be the most appropriate
framework.
Our study can also be compared to recently proposed Bayesian
accounts of schizophrenia [29,77]. Hallucinations in CBS could on
a high level be described as internal priors being too strong.
Bayesian accounts of schizophrenia, however, involve more
complex hypotheses about the role of feed-forward and feed-back
processing (e.g. in the context of predictive coding [29]) that are
not the focus of our study.
Some open questions in CBS
One of the issues we have not addressed is what limits the
incidence of complex hallucinations and CBS to about 11% to
15% of patients suffering from visual impairment [4]. Our
modelling results suggest however that a variety of parameters
can influence whether and when hallucinations occur. In the
model, the nature and degree of visual impairment as well the
effect and variability of other interacting factors, such as ACh
levels, determine how much homeostatic adaptation is necessary to
push cortical activity into the hallucinating regime. Limits on how
much cortical neurons can adapt their excitability therefore would
restrict hallucinations to only certain cases, and there might be
variability in such parameters of homeostasis across the population
as well. Thus, that only some patients with visual impairment
develop hallucinations could simply reflect the variance of the
underlying relevant parameters. Similar reasoning might explain
the diversity of symptoms among CBS patients.
Differences in hallucinatory content, e.g. whether it does or does
not involve movement, faces, strong colours, etc., likely relate to
the specialisation of different cortical areas [3,71], and potentially
to their selective sensory deprivation (such as more extensive
impairment of colour vision possibly predisposing patients with
senile macular degeneration to experience coloured hallucinations
[3]). A specialisation of different areas to different aspects of the
sensory data was not a feature of our model. However, it seems
reasonable to extrapolate from our results to a model extended in
that regard. In our simulations, restricting sensory input by either
removing only parts of the images or by just fixing input to a single
image led to hallucinations that reflected the specific lack in the
input (namely hallucinations in the deprived part of the visual
field, or of object types not present in the fixed input image,
respectively). If different parts of the model were to distinctly
represent properties of visual input in analogy to for example
cortical areas V4 for colour and MT for motion, we would expect
a specific deprivation of that input property to lead to
corresponding hallucinatory representations.
An open question in CBS is also in how far hallucinated content
reflects visual memories of some sort [4], although the elaborate
and occasionally bizarre nature of the images might speak against
this (see [2,12] for examples). In this context it is relevant that the
DBM has been shown to be capable of synthesising images that
generalise beyond what it has been trained on [65]. Moreover, in
light of the bizarre or unusual hallucinatory imagery in CBS, some
hallucinations with low quality in our simulations (as measured
relative to training images) could possibly be interpreted as such
unnatural imagery (see e.g. Figure 8b (3); Ruppin et al. [53] made
a similar observation in their model).
Challenges for a computational model of CBS
The key for a model of CBS is to account for the ability of the
brain to synthesise rich internal representations of images even
without visual input, representations that possibly generalise over
earlier experienced inputs (as argued above). This does not
necessarily imply that the brain implements a generative model, in
the sense captured by the DBM. However, the strength of such
generative frameworks is that they account for these aspects
naturally, at least in principle.
For comparison, a perceptual Bayesian model defined over a
single low-dimensional variable can be sufficient to account for
perceptual illusions concerning a property of an object (e.g. due to a
prior for slow speeds [80]), but it is far-off from actually generating
a full visual representation of the object itself. Similarly, the
necessity for synthesis without input implies that a model
computing a rich code of a given image is on its own not sufficient
either. For example, the predictive coding model of [18] and the
sparse coding model of [81] are both formulated as generative
models that learn representations from images. Given an input
image, they can infer a code that is rich enough in information to
reconstruct the former. However, neither model can, when run
purely generatively, synthesise structured images or anything akin
to objects (although [82] demonstrate that memorised images can
be recalled). In particular, sparse coding trained on images tends
to discover localised patches of edges as independent ‘causes’.
Thus, without an extension to higher level causes, a generated
image will be a random superposition of such edges.
Similarly, neural networks like (deep) auto-encoders learn
internal representations by reconstructing input. Using bottlenecks
in the hidden layers, sparsity, input reconstruction from noise-
corrupted input and other techniques [37], they also learn about
the underlying structure in images, enabling them to reconstruct
from corrupted input, perform dimensionality reduction, or even
learn transformations of the content [83]. However, there is no
way of generating from these models in the absence of input (but
see the recent work of [84]). Hence, again such an approach might
be used to model illusions, but not hallucinations.
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Clearly, while our model, the DBM, is a generative model, its
capability to generate ‘images’ still leaves much to be desired when
it comes to matching the perceptual richness attributed to real
images (although the DBM and closely related models have shown
more potential in that regard than what is demonstrated here, see
[36,85,86]). As model of cortical representations and processing, it
also makes several simplifying abstractions, such as lumping
together the highly differentiated feedforward and feedback
connections in the cortex (e.g. [87]) into simple symmetrical
connections. Of particular interest are thus recent extensions that
could enhance the generative performance of DBM-like ap-
proaches while at the same time having biological relevance as
well, such as including lateral connections [88] or complex cell like
pooling [89,90].
However, our work here demonstrates that the DBM does in
principle capture several aspects important for explaining CBS,
idealisations notwithstanding. It is not meant as definitive model of
generative processing in the brain, but rather serves as a simple
idealised model system just complex enough to convey the points
in question. Among the relevant aspects it captures is, first, the
aforementioned capability to synthesise representations of input.
Second, its hierarchical and topographic representations allowed
us to model localised impairment and a role for ACh. Third, the
nature of the DBM as a neural network made it possible to model
concrete cellular homeostatic mechanisms. Fourth, unlike for
example the earlier Helmholtz machine model [91], the DBM uses
top-down interactions also during inference, not just learning,
another requirement for modelling the role of hierarchical bottom-
up and top-down processing for hallucinations. There are other
aspects of cortical processing that are not part of the DBM
framework but were not essential to the questions we sought to
address in this work. The DBM would be less suitable if, for
example, one were to hypothesise that some features of CBS relate
specifically to the anatomical or functional asymmetry of cortical
feedforward and feedback connections.
ACh and probabilistic inference
Our model of the action of ACh is closely related in spirit to that
of Yu and Dayan [27]. In a sense we addressed some of the issues
they identified with their own approach, namely only dealing with
a localist representation of a low-dimensional variable, and only
with a shallow hierarchy where the interaction of bottom-up and
top-down is confined to a single stage. As they write, ‘‘it would be
more biologically realistic to consider distributed representations
at each of many levels in a hierarchy’’, which might be closer to
what our model implements.
In Yu and Dayan’s model, the ACh mechanism implements an
approximation to exact inference: only a single hypothesis is
maintained at any point in time by the top-down part of the
system, with ACh controlling the impact of that hypothesis on
perceptual inference. This is comparable to the action of ACh on
the influence of higher layers on lower layers in our model.
However, the functional role of ACh was not the main focus of our
work, and in some ways their model is significantly more
sophisticated than ours in that regard. In particular, in their
model the ACh level is itself controlled by the system dynamically
during ongoing inference, whereas we merely manipulated ACh
manually to explore its impact on emerging hallucinations.
Whether such an internal control of the ACh parameter a could
be implemented in the DBM framework, in particular in a
principled fashion, is open.
Another issue is in how far the role of ACh, and the interaction
of top-down and bottom-up in hallucinations in general, is
necessarily to be interpreted in ‘Bayesian’ or probabilistic terms.
In Yu and Dayan’s model, ACh represents the uncertainty
associated with the current top-down hypothesis, and this
uncertainty is itself subject to ongoing probabilistic inference.
Because a mechanism for inferring this uncertainty is lacking in
our model, we would be more cautious to necessarily frame the
interaction of bottom-up and top-down as ‘Bayesian’ here. For our
approach here, the probabilistic nature of the DBM only comes
into play in so far as it allows for a means of formulating and
deriving a generative model of sensory data (we emphasise the
probabilistic aspect of the DBM model elsewhere [35,52]).
The nature of hallucinatory experience
A subtle issue is how much information needs to be synthesised
in the brain, and in what form, to generate the visual experience of
hallucinations. Mostly avoiding the difficult question of the neural
correlates of consciousness here (e.g. [92]), we can at least pose
necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the generated
neuronal representations to evoke complex visual hallucinations:
they somehow must entail the information content that is implied
in the percepts (assuming CBS patients are not just confabulating).
For example, both seeing and hallucinating a dog entails much
more than just being aware (and able to report) that the object in
question is indeed a dog, i.e. some sort of category label. Rather, it
involves perceiving the shape, contours, texture, colours, and so
forth. Thus, internal activation of an abstract, low-dimensional
representation of the concept of a dog would not be sufficient.
For instance, consider a simple perceptual model consisting of a
neural network classifier such as a perceptron, which has learnt to
classify images of dogs against other images, using a single binary
output ‘neuron’. Internal activation of this unit alone cannot
possibly be accompanied by the visual experience of seeing a dog,
as the single bit of information conveyed by its state cannot
possibly be used to differentiate among the various possible
instantiations of dogs (a dalmatian in a specific pose rather than a
poodle in another, etc.) [93].
The synthesis of rich internal representations of data, and how
this capability is acquired through learning in the first place, is
naturally explained in strong generative models such as the DBM.
In the cortical hierarchy, a top-down generative component could
also offer a mechanism to recover more detailed low-level
representations from more high-level abstract representations,
details that might be discarded during bottom-up or feedforward
processing to obtain invariant representations (e.g. [94]). Alterna-
tively, such detailed information might still be present at the high-
level, but be only implicit and not easy to access by the rest of the
brain. Top-down processing could then serve to transform such
information into a more explicit (for the rest of the brain)
representation. Either could explain why the generation of
conscious experience might be related to re-entrant top-down
processing [92].
Conclusion
We have demonstrated how the DBM as a generative neural
network can provide potential insights into the mechanisms
underlying complex visual hallucinations in CBS. Our results here,
together with other work [35,52,66], offer a novel perspective on
perceptual phenomena by relating them to inference in a
generative model in the cortex.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Emergence of hallucinations due to homeo-
static adaptation. Equivalent to Figure 6 in the main text, but
with a model trained on the shapes data set instead of MNIST. See
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main text for detailed explanation. (A–C) Removing the visual
input led to a drop of activity levels and subsequent recovery
through homeostatic adaptation (original activity levels as dashed
lines). (D–F) Quality of hallucinations (i.e. how well decoded
internal representations matched the learnt images), which
emerged after an initial period of silence. 5 out of 100 trials per
iteration are plotted. Blue curves denote mean quality over 100
trials in that iteration.
(EPS)
Figure S2 Comparison of results of homeostatic adap-
tation for blank input images or noise images. The noise
images contained 10% white pixels on black background. Light
curves and dark curves correspond to blank and noise images,
respectively. (A–C) Results (activity changes and hallucination
quality) for the model trained on shapes. (D–F) Results for the
model trained on MNIST. For both models, noise input caused
hallucinations to emerge after fewer iterations and with less
adaptation of the biases. Moreover, comparing the differences in
activity between first and second layer across conditions, it appears
that the recovery of the first was less delayed relative to the second
when the former was receiving noise input.
(EPS)
Figure S3 Hallucinations for models that had their first
hidden layer ‘lesioned’ (clamped to zero). The first hidden
layer was lesioned rather than the visible input layer, modelling
damage to early cortical areas rather than prior in the visual
pathway. Results are overall analogous to the latter case (see main
text for explanation). (A–C) Results (activity changes and
hallucination quality) for the model trained on shapes. (D–F)
Results for the model trained on MNIST.
(EPS)
Text S1 Learning. A brief overview of how representations are
learned in a DBM.
(PDF)
Text S2 Additional training details. Summary of training
parameters used for learning the DBM model in this study.
(PDF)
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